Processes to automate the selection of appropriate algorithms for various matrix computations are described. In particular, processes to check for, and certify, various matrix properties of black-box matrices are presented. These include sparsity patterns and structural properties that allow "superfast" algorithms to be used in place of black-box algorithms. Matrix properties that hold generically, and allow the use of matrix preconditioning to be reduced or eliminated, can also be checked for and certified -notably including in the small-field case, where this presently has the greatest impact on the efficiency of the computation.
INTRODUCTION
Krylov-based "black box" algorithms for matrix computations have been used for significant applications in computation number theory. They also form a significant part of the C++ template library LinBox for high-performance matrix computations. These are notable, in part, because of their versatility: Any matrix representation that allows the input matrix (or, for some algorithms, its transpose) to be multiplied by a vector can be supported. Considerably more efficient algorithms can be used instead if the input matrix is sparse, with nonzero entries limited to specific locations, or satisfies one of various structural properties. As described, for example, by Golub and van Loan [6] , Gaussian Elimination can be used quite efficiently to solve banded systems of linear equations. As described by Pan [7] , various classes of matrices (including Toeplitz-like and Hankel-like matrices) have various displacement structures that can be used to reduce system solving for these matrices to polynomial arithmetic. Under these circumstances, assistance in selecting algorithms to be employed might of help as the community of users of systems like LinBox grows and non-expert users should be better supported. Sections 2-4 of this report therefore concern attempts to detect and certify matrix properties to facilitate algorithm selection. The preliminary results given here establish that Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. band matrices and matrices with low displacement rankincluding Toeplitz-like and Hankel-like matrices -are easily detected and certified. Furthermore, it is possible to convert matrix representations, in order to allow superfast algorithms to be applied, when such matrices are discovered. As black-box algorithms have been developed several matrix properties have been identified that hold generically and that be exploited -generally by eliminating "matrix preconditioning" -to simplify or accelerate computations without sacrificing reliability. In particular, the cost of system solving can be reduced if the input matrix has a small number of nontrivial nilpotent blocks in its Jordan normal form. Simpler algorithms to compute the rank or characteristic polynomial of a matrix can be applied if the input matrix has a small number of nontrivial invariant factors. Sections 5-7 concern the detection and certification of these properties. A technique of Villard [8] is adapted, for the small-field case, to efficiently check for these properties at a cost linear in that needed to apply Wiedemann's algorithm to compute the minimal polynomial of a matrix. Interactive protocols, of the type recently described by Dumas and Kaltofen [1] are also provided. Of course, many randomized black box algorithms are Las Vegas, so that one can simply execute algorithms without preconditioning, in hopes that desirable matrix properties are satisfied or that one "gets lucky." The above results may nevertheless be of interest if one considers exchanges between a service provider and client involving the cost of a service that is to be provided: One would hope here that the cost to the service provider (or "prover") would not exceed the lower cost to carry out a computation without preconditioning, while the cost to the client (or "verifier') would be significantly lower than that. Furthermore, a process to certify that preconditioning is necessary would also be of interest. Protocols to certify this are also given. The expected (and, in a few cases, worst-case) costs established to detect and certify these properties, and for their verification, are as shown in Table 1 . In each case, the indicated cost is the number of field operations required for a black-box matrix A ∈ F n×n ; µ ≤ n(2n + 1) is the number of operations required to multiply either A or A T by a given vector v ∈ F n×1 . It is also assumed that µ ≥ n. M(n) is the number of operations in F required for arithmetic in an extension E of F with logarithmic degree, so that M(n) ∈ O(log 2 n log 2 log 2 n log 2 log 2 log 2 n). The "communication" reports the number of elements of the ground field F (plus, in some cases, bits) that must be communicated between a prover and a verifier -excluding the initial cost to communicate a black box matrix A ∈ F n×n , parameter k and error tolerance ǫ. In typical applications one might expect k to be significantly smaller than n -indeed, polylogarithmic. The cost to check for band structure or low displacement rank, and return the information needed for superfast algorithms to be applied when they can, is significantly dominated by the cost to use a black box algorithm to complete a computation instead, in this case. A proof of one key claim -Theorem 5.2 -has been omitted. This can be proved using a rather lengthly combinatorial argument. The complete proof is available in a longer version of this report [4] .
BAND STRUCTURE
Let A ∈ F n×n and let k be a positive constant. Let us say that A is a band matrix with band width k if the entry ai,j of A in row i and column j is equal to 0 whenever 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and |i − j| > k. Golub and van Loan [6] describe efficient algorithms, based on Gaussian Elimination, for computations on such matrices. As shown below the detection and certification of a blackbox matrix that is a band matrix, and conversion to a representation allowing other algorithms to be used, is surprisingly easy. Indeed, this is included, in part, to provide a very simple first example. The objective of this section is to prove the following. 
Detection and Certification
Let K = 2k + 1 and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ K, let αK,i ∈ F n×1 such that, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the j th entry of αK,i is equal to one if j ≡ i mod k and is zero otherwise. If A has band width k then no two (or more) of columns i, i+K, i+2K, . . . of A have nonzero entries in the same row. The nonzero entries of these columns can therefore simply be read off as entries of the vector A · αK,i -and all of the nonzero entries of A can be read off the nonzero entries of each of the vectors A · αK,1, A · αK,2, . . . , A · αK,K . Consequently, K = 2k + 1 multiplications of A by vectors suffice for the prover to produce a representation of A as a band matrix with band width k if it indeed has this structure. Of course, this should not be delivered to a verifier without being checked. It is possible that there is no band matrix A ∈ F n×n , with band width k, such that AαK,i = AαK,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ K -for it may be necessary for a matrix to have off-band entries in some of columns k + 1, k + 2, . . . , K or n − K, n − K + 1, . . . , n − k − 1 in order for it to satisfy these equations -and one should stop here if this is the case. Otherwise the band matrix A that satisfies these conditions is unique and it suffices to check that A = A. An application of the test of Frievalds [5] suffices to check this: A vector x ∈ F n×1 , whose entries are chosen uniformly and independently from a finite subset S of F, should be selected by the prover, and it should be checked whether Ax = Ax. If this is not the case then A = A and, once again, one should stop. On the other hand, it is easily checked that if A = A, and x is chosen as above, then the probability that Ax = Ax is at most 1/|S| -so that, provided that S is sufficiently large, the prover should deliver a certificate so that a verification stage can proceed.
Verification
The certificate provided to the verifier, at this point, should simply be a representation of A as a band matrix -presumably provided as an n × (2k + 1) array reporting the entries within the bands of A. This can be verified using an independent repetition of the Frievalds test described above. Since the product of a band matrix A ∈ F k×k (with band width k) and a vector x ∈ F n×1 can be computed using Θ(nk) field operations and zero tests, Theorem 2.1 is now immediate -assuming, again, that µ ≥ n.
LOW MATRIX RANK
The following is less general than the protocol of Dumas and Kaltofen [1] to certify matrix rank and, therefore, inferior in at least one significant respect. However, it can be used in the special case needed here: One is certifying that the rank of A ∈ F n×n is at most k, when k is significantly smaller than n. It also includes the construction of an alternative representation of A as needed to support the claims in Section 4. Suppose now that A ∈ F n×n has positive rank r ≤ k. Then there exist permutation matrices P, Q ∈ F n×n , matrices L ∈ F (n−r)×r and R ∈ F r×(n−r) , and a nonsingular matrix C ∈ F r×r , such that
The objective of this section is to establish the following. 
Detection and Certification
Since the rank of A cannot exceed that of C, no decomposition as shown at line (3.1) can exist unless the rank of A is at most k. A prover can check for this condition by attempting to construct the matrices included in this decomposition, along with C −1 . Let 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and suppose indices i1, i2, . . . , i ℓ of rows and j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ of columns of an ℓ × ℓ nonsingular submatrix C ℓ of A have been computed, along with the matrix C −1 ℓ . If ℓ = 0 then the prover should begin by generating n values uniformly and independently from a finite subset S of F and using these as the entries of a vector x ∈ F n×1 . If A is nonzero then Ax = 0 with probability 1 − 1/|S| -so that (if |S| is sufficiently large) the prover may conclude that the rank of A is zero, if Ax = 0, and proceed to delivery of a certificate. Otherwise x should be used to locate a nonzero column of A.
Suppose that x has h nonzero entries. Set x1, x2 ∈ F m×1 such that x1 has ⌈h/2⌉ nonzero entries, x2 has ⌊h/2⌋ nonzero entries, and x = x1 +x2. One should check whether Ax1 = 0 -replacing x with x1 if this is not the case, and replacing x with x2 otherwise, since Ax2 = Ax = 0 in this second case. Iterating this process at most ⌈log 2 n⌉ times, a vector x ∈ F n×1 such that Ax = 0, and x has a single nonzero entry in some position j1, is obtained -establishing that the j th 1 column of A is nonzero. This column has now been computed, as Ax, and i1 can be chosen to be any integer such that 1 ≤ i1 ≤ n and the entry α of A in row i1 and column j1 is nonzero -so that
If ℓ > 0 then the prover should begin, once again, by forming the vector x as described above. The prover should continue by computing the matrix-vector product v = Ax, and setting y ∈ F ℓ×1 to be the vector such that, for 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ, the entry of y in position h is the entry of v in position i h . The vector z = C −1 ℓ y ∈ F ℓ×1 should next be computed. Let w ∈ F n×1 be the vector such that, for 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ, the entry of w in position j h is the entry of z in position h, and such that all other entries of w are zero. Finally, set u = v − A · w -noting that v is in the space spanned by columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ of A if and only if u = 0. If the rank of A is equal to ℓ then u must always be equal to zero; u is nonzero with probability at least 1 − 1/|S| otherwise. Consequently if u = 0 then the prover should proceed with the completion of a certificate, as described below. Otherwise, if x has h nonzero entries then one should once again set x1, x2 ∈ F n×1 such that x1 has ⌈h/2⌉ entries, x2 has ⌊h/2⌋ entries, and x = x1+x2. The above process should be applied to x1 (instead of x) to check whether Ax1 is in the space spanned by columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ of A -replacing x with x1 if this is not the case, and replacing x with x2 otherwise. Iterating this process at most ⌈log 2 n⌉ times one eventually obtains a vector x ∈ F n×1 such that Ax is not in the space spanned by columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ of A and x has a single nonzero entry in some position j ℓ+1 . This establishes that the j th ℓ+1 column of A is not in the space spanned by columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ -and that columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ+1 of A are linearly independent. One should next compute the vector u ∈ F n×1 , as described above, corresponding to the final choice of the vector x -so that u = 0. It suffices to choose i ℓ+1 such that 1 ≤ i ℓ+1 ≤ n and the i th ℓ+1 entry of u is nonzero in order to ensure that the submatrix C ℓ+1 of A, including entries in rows i1, i2, . . . , i ℓ+1 and columns j1, j2, . . . , j ℓ+1 , is nonsingular. Note next that
for vectors s ∈ F ℓ×1 and t ∈ F 1×ℓ , and for some value α ∈ F. Since C ℓ is nonsingular,
where
ℓ s. Now β = 0, since C ℓ+1 is also nonsingular, and
ℓ+1 can be used to compute the entries of C −1 ℓ+1 using Θ(ℓ 2 ) operations in F. The value ℓ can now be incremented and the above process repeated. If this process is iterated until ℓ = k + 1, then the rank of A is greater than k and one can stop. Otherwise the rank r ≤ k of A has been obtained, along with the matrix C = Cr ∈ F r×r shown at line (3.1), and the indices of the rows and columns of this matrix in A. The permutation matrices P and Q, shown at line (3.1), can each be concisely represented as an integer array, with length n, whose i th entry is the index of the nonzero entry in row i of the permutation matrix. Since the first r entries of this representation of Q are the indices j1, j2, . . . , jr, it is not difficult to compute this representation of Q using O(n) operations on integers whose binary representations have length O(log n): The only operations required are the initialization of these arrays, comparisons of integers and assignments of values. If a first array is initially sorted and a second integer array is used to maintain the locations of each of 1, 2, . . . , n in the initial array then one can reorder 1, 2, . . . , n in order to obtain this representation of Q using O(r) exchanges of values in this array. The second of these arrays then provides a corresponding representation of Q T . Since the initial entries of a representation of P T are the indices i1, i2, . . . , ir, a representation of P T and P can be computed in the same way using O(n) operations on integers with length in O(log n) as well. It remains only to notice that if AL ∈ F n×r is the matrix including columns j1, j2, . . . , jr of A, and AR ∈ F r×n is the matrix including rows i1, i2, . . . , ir of A, then
and
Since C −1 has already been computed, L and R can be computed using O(nr 2 ) additional arithmetic operations in F and Θ(n log 2 n) operations on bits. A consideration of the above confirms that Θ(nk 2 +kµ log n) arithmetic operations in F and Θ(n log 2 n) operations on bits have been used, in the worst case, to check whether the rank of A is at most k, and to compute the rank and the decomposition at line (3.1) if this is the case. This process can only fail due to unlucky choices of the randomly selected vectors x ∈ F n×1 , described above. Since each selection fails with probability at most 1/|S| and at most min(r, k) + 1 such vectors must be selected if A has rank r, the total probability of failure is at most (r + 1)/|S| if r ≤ k and at most (k + 1)/|S| otherwise.
Verification
Once again, it suffices to apply the Frievalds test to verify that A is the zero matrix, if the reported rank is zero, or that the decomposition of A, shown at line (3.1), is correct otherwise. An examination of this decomposition confirms that this test can be carried out at the cost stated in the above lemma.
LOW DISPLACEMENT RANK
For α ∈ F, the n × n α-circulant matrix Zα is the matrix
whose entry in row i + 1 and column i is 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, whose entry in row 1 and column n is α, and all of whose other entries are zero. Consider the following linear operators on matrices in F n×n :
•
n×n is Toeplitz-like (respectively, Hankellike, and Toeplitz+Hankel-like) if the rank of the matrix ϕT (A) (respectively, ϕH (A), and ϕT H (A)) is small relative to n. The matrix ϕT (A) (respectively, ϕH (A) or ϕT H (A)) is called the operator matrix and rank of this matrix is said to be the displacement rank of A. As described, for example, by Pan [7] , a variety of matrix computations have "superfast algorithms" if the displacement rank of a matrix is low. Indeed, if the displacement rank is polylogarithmic in n then the worst-case running times of these algorithms are generally within a polylogarithmic factor of linear in n. A black box for multiplication of ϕT (A) (ϕH (A) or ϕT H (A)) by a vector is trivially obtained by applying a black box for multiplication of A by a vector, twice, and performing O(n) additional operations in F. The following, is therefore, immediate from Lemma 3.1. 
ADDITIVE CONDITIONERS
Recall that the invariant factors of a matrix A ∈ F n×n are monic polynomials ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm ∈ F[z], each with positive degree, such that ϕi is divisible by ϕi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and such that A is similar to a block diagonal matrix with the companion matrices of the polynomials ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm as its blocks. In this case ϕ1 is the minimal polynomial of A. An invariant factor ϕi is a nontrivial invariant factor if ϕi = z -for its companion matrix is different from the 1 × 1 zero matrix in this case. Additional (trivial) "invariant factors "' ϕi = 1 will occasionally be added, below, to simplify technical statements. The number of invariant factors divisible by z 2 is of interest because this is the same as the number of "nontrivial nilpotent blocks" (companion matrices of polynomials z j for j ≥ 2) in a Jordan normal form for A. A technique of Villard [8] , developed to provide a black box algorithm for computation of the Frobenius normal form, leads to an efficient interactive protocol to bound the number of nontrivial nilpotent blocks. In combination with a recent protocol of Dumas, Kaltofen, Thomé and Villard [2] to certify of the minimal polynomial of a matrix, this leads to an efficient protocol to bound the number of nontrivial invariant factors of a matrix as well. In particular, the following result of Villard [8, Lemma 1] is of use here. Villard also provided a result -[8, Theorem 2] -which is of use to confirm that A does not have k or more nontrivial nilpotent blocks, or nontrivial invariant factors, when F is sufficiently large. The following result complements Villard's result by allowing this to be checked for, when k is small, and when F is a very small finite field -the case where "preconditioning" is generally most complicated and expensive, so that the assurance that preconditioning can be avoided might be of greatest interest.
n×n where F is a finite field with size q. Let B = V · U where U ∈ F k×n , V ∈ F n×k , and the entries of U and V are selected uniformly and independently from F.
(a) If A has at most k nontrivial nilpotent blocks then the minimal polynomial of A+B is not divisible by z 2 with probability at least
(b) If A has at most k nontrivial invariant factors and f ∈ F[z] is an irreducible polynomial with degree d such that f = z, then the probability that f does not divide the minimal polynomial of A + B is at least
, and at least
A complete proof of Theorem 5.2 can be found in [4] . The matrix B, mentioned here, may be viewed as an additive preconditioner' being applied to A.
NONTRIVIAL NILPOTENT BLOCKS
Recall that a nilpotent block in the Jordan form of a matrix A ∈ F n×n is nontrivial if has order at least two -so that the minimal polynomial of this block is z j for j ≥ 2. The purpose of this section is to establish the following.
Theorem 6.1. It is possible to decide whether a matrix A ∈ F n×n has at most k nontrivial nilpotent blocks, in such a way that the incorrect decision is reached with probability at most ǫ for any positive constant ǫ. The cost to do so includes the selection of Θ(nk) values uniformly and independently from F and Θ(n 2 k + µn) arithmetic operations in F.
It is also possible both to certify that A has at most k nontrivial nilpotent blocks and to certify that A has more than k nontrivial nilpotent blocks. In both cases the verifier is guaranteed to accept if the prover's information is correct. The verifier accepts with probability at most ǫ if the prover's information is incorrect. For both protocols, the expected cost for the prover to complete the protocol is dominated by the worst-case cost for the initial decision stage, as given above. The cost for the verifier, when confirming that A has at most k nontrivial nilpotent blocks, includes the selection of Θ(n) values, uniformly and independently from F, and Θ(nk + µ) arithmetic operations in F.
The cost for the verifier, when confirming that A has more than k nontrivial nilpotent blocks, includes the selection of Θ(nk) values, uniformly and independently from F, and Θ(nk + µ) arithmetic operations in F.
Detection
Let σ(2) = 22, σ(3) = 4, σ(4) = σ(5) = 2, σ(q) = 1 when 7 ≤ q ≤ 13 and σ(q) = 2 when q ≥ 16. It is easily checked that if ρ(q) is as given in Theorem 5.2, for every prime power q, then (1 − ρ(q)) σ(q) ≤ 1/2 when 2 ≤ q ≤ 13 and (1 − ρ(q)) σ(q) ≤ q −1 when q ≥ 16. In order to check whether a black-box matrix A ∈ F n×n has at most k nontrivial invariant factors, when F = Fq, and to ensure that the probability of an incorrect decision is at most a positive constant ǫ, the prover should select τ pairs of matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k , for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , by choosing the entries of these matrices uniformly and independently from F -where τ = ⌈log 2 (2 · ǫ −1 )⌉ · σ(q) if 2 ≤ q ≤ 13 and τ = ⌈log q (2 · ǫ −1 )⌉ · σ(q) if q ≥ 16. Suppose first that A has more than k nilpotent blocks, so that the k + 1 st invariant factor of A is divisible by z 2 . Then it follows by Theorem 5.1, above, that the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui is divisible by z 2 for all i. For every such matrix it is easily checked, in this case, that if ui,j , vi,j ∈ F n×1 are chosen uniformly and independently from F n×1 then the minimal polynomial of the linearly recurrent sequence
is also divisible by z 2 with probability at least (1 − 1/q)
2
-which is equal to 1/4 if q = 2, and greater than 1 − 2/q if q ≥ 3. Consequently, if λ = ⌈log 4/3 (2 · τ · ǫ −1 )⌉ when q = 2, and λ = ⌈log q/2 (2 · τ · ǫ −1 )⌉ when q ≥ 3, and pairs of vectors ui,j and vi,j are chosen uniformly and independently from F n×1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ and 1 ≤ j ≤ λ, then, for each i, the probability there is no integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ λ, and the minimal polynomial of the linear recurrence at line (6.1) is divisible by z 2 , is at most ǫ/(2τ ). The probability that it has not been confirmed that the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui is divisible by z 2 , for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , is therefore certainly at most ǫ/2 < ǫ in this case. It follows that -for fixed q and ǫ -the number of applications of Wiedemann's algorithm needed to compute the minimal polynomials of sequences as above and confirm the above condition, with the desired reliability, is a constant. On the other hand, a straightforward calculation (involving τ , as given above) and an application of Theorem 5.2(a) establishes that if A has at most k nontrivial factors then this process fails -because the minimal polynomial of every matrix A + Vi · Ui, such that 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , is divisible by z 2 -with probability at most ǫ/2. One should again try to compute the minimal polynomial of each matrix A + Vi · Ui by computing the minimal polynomials of linearly recurrent sequences of the form shown at line (6.1) for λ uniformly and independently pairs of vectors ui,j , vi,j ∈ F n×1 . If 1 ≤ i ≤ τ and the minimal polynomial of A + ViUi is not divisible by z 2 , then the minimal polynomial of the linear recurrent sequence shown at line (6.1) is not divisible by z 2 , either, for any j that 1 ≤ j ≤ λ. On the other hand, it follows by the above analysis that there will exist an integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ λ and the minimal polynomial of the above linearly recurrent sequence is divisible by z 2 , for every integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ τ and the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui is divisible by z 2 , with probability at least 1 − ǫ/2. In this case a pair of matrices U ∈ F k×n and V ∈ F n×k , such that the minimal polynomial of A + V · U is not divisible by z 2 , can be selected by choosing any one of the pairs of matrices Ui and Vi that have not been eliminated using the above process. The probability that either this case has not been correctly identified, or a pair of matrices U and V as described above has not been correctly selected, is at most ǫ.
Since the cost to multiply A + V · U by a vector v ∈ F n×1 , includes the cost, µ, to multiply A by a vector, along with Θ(nk) additional operations, it is straightforward to modify the analysis of Wiedemann's algorithm in order to conclude that the cost of the above process includes the uniform and independent selection of Θ(nk) values from F, along with Θ(n 2 k + µn) arithmetic operations in F, as claimed.
Few Nilpotent Blocks: Certification and Verification
If the prover has determined that A has at most k nontrivial nilpotent blocks, as described above, then the prover should commit by sending matrices U ∈ F k×n and V ∈ F n×k , such that the minimal polynomial of A + V · U is not divisible by z 2 , to the verifier: These have now been obtained. It is easily checked, by consideration of a rational Jordan form, that if the minimal polynomial of a matrix B ∈ F n×n is not divisible by z 2 , then a system Bx = b is consistent (for a given vector b ∈ F n×1 ), if and only if the system B 2 x = b is consistent as well. On the other hand, if the minimal polynomial of B is divisible by z 2 and a vector c ∈ F n×n is selected uniformly and independently, then the probability that the system B 2 x = Bc is consistent is at most |F| −1 . The verifier may therefore form a challenge by selecting γ = ⌈log q ǫ −1 ⌉ vectors c1, c2, . . . , cγ uniformly and independently from F n×1 (for q = |F|), computing bi = (A + V · U )ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ, and sending b1, b2, . . . , bγ to the prover. The prover should compute vectors x1, x2, . . . , xγ ∈ F n×1 such that (A + V · U ) 2 xi = bi (possibly by applying Wiedemann's algorithm twice, for each i) and send these to the verifier. Finally, the verifier should check whether the required equalities are satisfied -accepting if they are, and rejecting otherwise. If the prover's information is correct then the verifier accepts with certainty; otherwise the verifier accepts, incorrectly, with probability at most ǫ. The cost to the prover, to complete this protocol, is dominated by the cost of the "detection" stage described above. Since the verifier must only choose Θ(n) values uniformly and independently from F and multiply a constant number of vectors by A+V ·U , the number of operations used by the verifier is as claimed.
Many Nilpotent Blocks: Certification and Verification
If the prover has determined, instead, that A has more than k nontrivial nilpotent blocks, then the prover should commit by advising the verifier of this. The verifier should then select matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , for τ as above, by selecting the entries of these matrices uniformly and independently from F. These matrices should then be sent to the prover as a challenge. In response the prover should return vectors xi ∈ F n×1 such that (A + Vi · Ui)xi = 0 = (A + Vi · Ui) 2 xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ . The verifier should then accept if these conditions are all satisfied and reject otherwise. Once again, Theorem 5.1 can be used to establish that this protocol is perfectly complete -the verifier accepts with certainty if the prover's information is correct. Theorem 5.2 and a straightforward calculation establishes that it is also sound: If the prover's information is incorrect then the probability that the verifier accepts is at most ǫ. In order to see that the additional cost for the prover is low, recall that the minimal polynomial of a matrix B ∈ F n×n and vector v ∈ F n×1 is the monic polynomial g ∈ F[z] with least degree such that g(B)v = 0. Wiedemann's algorithm can be used to compute the minimal polynomial of A+Vi ·Ui and a vector v, as the least common multiple of a number of linearly recurrent sequences as shown at line (6.1), with v = vi,j and uniform and independent choices of the vector ui,j. A small number of choices of ui,j suffice to ensure that the minimal polynomial of (A + Vi · Ui)v has been discovered with high probability. Furthermore, if vectors vi,j ∈ F n×1 are chosen uniformly and independently from F n×1 , for j = 1, 2, . . . ,, and the minimal polynomial of A+Vi·Ui is divisible by z 2 , then the expected number of vectors vi,j that must be considered, before a vector v = vi,j is found such that the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui and v is also divisible by z 2 , is at most two. Suppose now that a vector v ∈ F n×1 has been discovered and it has been confirmed that the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui and v is z 2 g for some polynomial g ∈ F[z]. It suffices to compute and return the vector xi = g(A + Vi)v in order to satisfy the requirements given above. The expected cost for the prover to complete this protocol is, once again, dominated by the worst-case cost of the "detection" stage. The cost for the verifier includes the selection of Θ(nk) values uniformly and independently from F and a constant number of multiplications of A + Vi · Ui by vectors, for matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k -establishing the above claim.
NONTRIVIAL INVARIANT FACTORS
The purpose of this section is to establish the following.
Theorem 7.1. One can decide whether a matrix A ∈ F n×n has at most k nontrivial invariant factors, such that the incorrect decision is made with probability at most ǫ for any positive constant ǫ. The expected cost of this includes the selection of Θ(nk) values uniformly and independently from F and Θ(n 2 k + µn) arithmetic operations in F. It is also possible both to certify that A has at most k nontrivial invariant factors and to certify that A has more than k nontrivial invariant factors. In both cases the verifier is guaranteed to accept if the prover's information is correct. The verifier accepts with probability at most ǫ if the prover's information is incorrect. For both protocols, the expected cost for the prover to complete the protocol is in O(n 2 M(n) + n 2 k log 2 n + µn log 2 n), where M(n) is the number of operations in F required for an arithmetic operation in a extension E with degree in O(log 2 n) over F. When certifying that A has at most k nontrivial invariant factors, the verifier selects O(n log 2 n) values uniformly and independently from F and performs Θ(nM(n) + nk + µ) arithmetic operations in F. When certifying that A has more than k nontrivial invariant factors the verifier selects O(n log 2 n + nk) values uniformly and independently from F and performs O(nM(n) + nk + µ) arithmetic operations in F.
Detection
The k + 1 st invariant factor ϕ k+1 of A is divisible by z 2 if and only if A has more than k nontrivial nilpotent blocks. The process described in Subsection 6.1 should be applied to check this, with parameters chosen to ensure that the probability of failure is at most ǫ/2. If ϕ k+1 is not divisible by z 2 then a pair of matrices U0 ∈ F k×n and V0 ∈ F n×k have been found such that the minimal
-and f0 has been correctly computed with probability at least 1 − ǫ/2 as well. The detection stage should proceed with an attempt to compute a factor χ = z of ϕ k+1 with positive degree, along with a certificate of this factor -or to determine that no such factor exists. Suppose first that q = |F| = 2. In this case a straightforward variant of the protocol described in Subsection 6.1 can be used either to conclude either that ϕ k+1 is divisible by z + 1 or to obtain matrices U1 ∈ F k×n and V1 ∈ F n×k such that the minimal polynomial f1 ∈ F[z] of A+V1·U1 is not divisible by z + 1. Suppose that this is carried out in such a way that the probability of failure is at most ǫ/6 -so that U1, V1 and f1 have also been obtained with probability at least 1 − ǫ/6 as well in the second case. If it has been determined that ϕ k+1 is not divisible by z + 1, then a variant of the above protocol should be applied, once again, either to conclude that ϕ k+1 is divisible by z 2 + z + 1 (the only monic irreducible polynomial in F[z] with degree two) or to obtain matrices U2 ∈ F k×n and V2 ∈ F n×k such that the minimal polynomial f2 ∈ F[x] of A + V2 · U2 is not divisible by z 2 + z + 1. Suppose, as above, that this is carried out in such a way that the probability of failure (including failure to compute U2, V2 and f2) is at most ǫ/6. Suppose, now, that it has been determined that ϕ k+1 is not divisible by z 2 + z + 1 either. Suppose that an additional three pairs of matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k are selected uniformly and independently,for 3 
, it can be shown that if fii the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui, for 3 ≤ i ≤ 5, then the probability that gcd(f3, f4, f5) has a monic irreducible factor, with degree at least three, that is not also a factor of ϕ k+1 , is at most 1 4 . Consequently if one chooses matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k uniformly and independently, for 3 ≤ i ≤ τ +2, instead, where τ = 3⌈log 4 (12ǫ −1 ⌉, and fi is the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui for all such i, then gcd(f3, f4, . . . , fτ+2)/ϕ k+1 has an irreducible factor, with degree at most three, that is not also a divisor of ϕ k+1 , with probability at most ǫ/12. As discussed in Subsection 6.1, it is possible to ensure that each of the above minimal polynomials fi of A = Vi · Ui is computed in such a way that the probability of failure here is also at most ǫ/12, by computing the minimal polynomials of Θ(log 2 (ǫ −1 )) linearly recurrent sequences as shown at line (6.1). At this point, either a divisor of ϕ k+1 with positive degree that is different from z has been identified, or matrices Ui ∈ F k×n , Vi ∈ F n×k , and the minimal poly-
, such that gcd(f0, f1, . . . , fτ+2) = ϕ k+1 ∈ {1, z}. The probability of failure of this process is at most ǫ, and (for fixed ǫ) the prover has selected Θ(nk) values uniformly and independently from F, and performed Θ(n 2 k + µn) arithmetic operations in F. A similar analysis establishes that if |F| = q = 3 then if Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k are chosen uniformly and independently, and fi ∈ F[z] is the minimal polynomial of A+Vi ·Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, then ψ = gcd(f1, f2, . . . , f6)/ϕ k+1 has an irreducible factor that is not also a factor of ϕ k+1 with probability at most 1/2. If one chooses 5⌈log 2 (4ǫ −1 )⌉ pairs of matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and V ∈ F n×k uniformly and independently, and fi ∈ F[z] is the minimal polynomial of A + Vi · Ui for all such i, then the probability that gcd(f1, f2, . . . , f ⌈log 2 (4ǫ −1 )⌉ ) has an irreducible factor that is not also a factor of ϕ k+1 is at most ǫ/4. A computation of Θ(log 2 (ǫ −1 )) minimal polynomials of linearly recurrent sequences, as shown at line (6.1), suffices to establish that all minimal polynomials fi are correctly computed with probability at most 1 − ǫ/4, as needed to obtain a similar process whose failure probability is also at most ǫ and that has the same asymptotic cost. Similar combinatorial arguments, and applications of Theorem 5.2(b), establish similar results when q = |F| ≥ 4: If q = 4 or q = 5 then the process described for the case q = 3 can be applied, except that the multiplicative constant "5," included above, can be reduced to "4". This constant can be reduced to 3 when 7 ≤ q ≤ 13, and it can be reduced to 2 when q ≥ 16. Additional information is useful if it has been decided that ϕ k+1 ∈ {1, z}. First, it is useful to have a pair of vectors ui, vi ∈ F n×1 , such that the minimal polynomial of the linearly recurrent sequence
is equal to the minimal polynomial fi of A + Vi · Ui, for all i as above. These vectors can be generated as fi is being computed, with an expected cost dominated by the cost to complete the above process -see, for example, Eberly [3] for details. If it has been determined that A has at most k nontrivial invariant factors, so that c + 1 pairs of matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and VI ∈ F n×k , and corresponding minimal polynomials fi ∈ F[z] have been accumulated, such that gcd(f0, f1, . . . , fc) = ϕ k+1 ∈ {1, z}, then it will also be useful to compute matrices g0, g1, . . . , gc ∈ F[z] such that
Since c, for any field size q, the extended Euclidean algorithm can be applied to compute these polynomials, such that each polynomial gi has degree in O(n), at a cost that is dominated by the cost of the rest of this process.
Few Invariant Factors: Certification and Verification
In order to commit that A ∈ F n×n has at most k invariant factors, the prover should send a sequence of τ ∈ Θ(log 2 (ǫ −1 )) pairs of matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k , for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1, along with
• vectors ui, vi ∈ F n×1 such that fi is also the minimal polynomial of the linearly recurrent sequence shown at line (7.1), and
• polynomials gi ∈ F[z], for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1, each with degree in O(n), such that the equation at line (7.2) is also satisfied, where ϕ k+1 ∈ {1, z}.
Dumas, Kaltofen, Thomé and Villard [2] are primarily concerned with certification of the minimal polynomial of a matrix over a large field, namely a field F such that |F| ∈ Ω(n). However their observations about small field computations can be extended, in a straightforward way, to establish the following.
Theorem 7.2 (Dumas, et. al.) . It is possible for a prover to compute the minimal polynomial of a given matrix A ∈ F n×n and certify it using an interactive protocol that is perfectly complete and sound: An incorrect minimal polynomial is accepted with probability at most ǫ for any desired positive constant ǫ. The prover selects Θ(n log 2 n) values uniformly and independently from F and performs Θ(n 2 M(n)+µn log 2 n) additional operations in F while participating in this process, where M(n) is the number of operations in F required for an arithmetic operation in a field extension whose degree over F is logarithmic in n. The verifier selects O(n log 2 n) values uniformly and independently from F and performs O(nM(n) + µ) additional operations in F.
With that noted, it suffices to verify the information provided by the prover by participating in the protocol of Dumas, Kaltofen, Thomé and Villard to certify the minimal polynomial fi of A + Vi · Ui for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1. If one wishes to ensure that the total probability of failure is at most ǫ then the protocol should be applied to ensure that no incorrect minimal polynomial is accepted with probability at most ǫ/ τ . If any of these is rejected then the verifier should reject here too. Otherwise the verifier should check that τ −1 i=0 gifi ∈ {1, λ} -accepting if this is the case, and rejecting otherwise. Perfect completeness and soundness of this protocol are easily established. The costs for the prover and verifier, given in Theorem 7.1, follow from the fact that the cost to multiply A + ViUi by a vector is in Θ(µ + nk).
Many Invariant Factors: Certification and Verification
In this case, the prover has detected a factor χ ∈ F[z] of ϕ k+1 that is different from 1 or z; the prover should now commit to this protocol by sending χ to the verifier. The verifier should choose matrices Ui ∈ F k×n and Vi ∈ F n×k uniformly and independently, for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ −1, where τ = ⌈log 2 (2ǫ −1 )⌉ and send these to the prover as a challenge.
As a response the prover should return vectors ui, vi ∈ F n×1 such that the minimal polynomial of the linear recurrence at line (7.1) is χ, for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1. The prover and verifier should apply the protocol of Dumas, Kaltofen, Thomé and Villard once again, in order to confirm thisensuring that any incorrect pair of vectors is accepted with probability at most ǫ/(2 τ ), so that the total probability of failure is at most ǫ, once again. The verifier can generate the above vectors by generating vectors ui, vi ∈ F n×1 such that the linearly recurrent sequence generated by A + Vi · Ui, ui and vi is the same as the minimal polynomial fi of A + Vi · Ui, and setting ui = ui and vi = (fi/χ)(A+Vi·Ui) vi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ τ −1. Arguments given above can now be applied, once again, to establish that the costs for the prover and verifier to complete this protocol are as in Theorem 7.1.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Additional properties allowing other "superfast" algorithms to be used might also be efficiently detected. For example, one might be able to detect some cases when nested dissection can be applied. The detection of Vandermonde-like and Cauchy-like matrices might be of interest -and also might be more challenging than that of detecting Toeplitzlike matrices: The operator matrices for Vandermonde-like and Cauchy-like matrices are defined using diagonal matrices whose entries can vary, and one would need to discover these diagonal matrices as part of a detection process. This report has focussed on the case where k is extremely small. However, various "superfast" algorithms would still be superior to a black box algorithm for larger k -for example, for k ≤ √ n. Detection and conversion protocols that are effective, for larger k, might therefore be of interest. Protocols such that the parameter k is not selected by a client (or verifier), but is instead discovered by the service provider (or prover), can be generally be obtained by modifying the protocols in this report in a straightforward way. Finally, black box algorithms are also used for various integer matrix computations, including computations involving the Smith form of a matrices. Protocols to decide and certify whether the number of nontrivial elementary divisors of a given integer matrix would therefore be of interest.
